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Abstract Most countries across Europe now have their own Inspectorate as part of a 
school improvement and accountability system. However there has been little research 
on the impact of school inspections or on the aspects of school inspections that 
maximise the positive effects and minimise the unintended consequences. As a 
precursor to further research, this paper presents a program theory of the school 
inspection system in England (Ofsted), highlighting the underlying mechanisms that 
explain how Ofsted intends to promote school improvement. The program theory is 
derived in a systematic way using the policy scientific approach, which draws 
evidence from the multiple methods of interviews and source documents. The key 
mechanisms that underpin Ofsted’s promotion of school improvement were found to 
be the setting of standards, giving feedback, the use of sanctions and rewards, the 
collection of information on schools and public accountability. Details showing the 
logic behind these mechanisms are presented. The program theory is validated by 
senior personnel from Ofsted. The paper argues for more research in evaluating the 
impact of school inspection and the specific mechanisms that underpin it. 
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Introduction  
 
The majority of countries across Europe, have implemented systems of evaluation and 
accountability in order to ensure quality of education in schools (Eurydice, 2004). 
These systems (which also include for example testing and the publication of league 
tables) primarily take the form of school inspections, with most countries having their 
own Inspectorate. Despite this, and given the vast sums of public money spent on 
school inspection (in England alone in 2011/12 £167 million was spent on the 
inspection and regulation of education, children’s services and skills (Ofsted, 2012)) 
there is surprisingly little firm evidence for the impact of school inspections in the 
literature and on how school inspection is supposed to promote school improvement. 
Most of the research has been in England and the Netherlands but findings have been 
mixed (see for example De Wolf and Janssens, 2007; Shaw et al, 2003; Rosenthal, 
2004; Luginbuhl et al, 2009).  
 
The systems employed by inspectorates to drive school improvement vary across 
Europe, ranging from systems involving sanctions with governmental control to 
systems with few consequences based on peer review, and from emancipatory 
systems involving self-evaluation to bureaucratic systems involving compliance and 
regulation (Faubert, 2009; Hughes et al, 1997; McGarvey and Stoker, 1999; in Ehren 
et al, 2012). 
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The European Commission, Lifelong Learning Project, ‘The impact of school 
inspection on teaching and learning’, of which this study is part, aims to fill some of 
the gaps in this knowledge, by comparing differing inspectorates in six European 
countries in order to evaluate the impact of inspections and to attempt to identify the 
mechanisms that maximise a positive impact, and minimise any unintended effects. 
This comparative research started with a clear description of the conceptual model of 
the inspectorate in each country. Whether one is a proponent of theory-driven 
evaluation, with the aim of testing theoretical models with empirical data (e.g. Weiss, 
1997; Chen, 1990), or prefers theory-driven evaluation alongside randomised 
experiments designed to evaluate impact mechanisms (Cook, 2000), few can disagree 
with the value of developing a program theory (or conceptual model) of a program 
that is going to be evaluated. This is the purpose of this paper, which develops a 
conceptual model describing the mechanisms and assumptions that underpin the 
inspection system of state schools in England: The Office for Standards in Education, 
Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted). Ofsted has a number of roles, including 
providing accountability, ensuring compliance with national regulations, informing 
consumer choice, providing value for money and promoting service (including 
school) improvement (Ofsted, 2005; England, 2006).   This paper will focus on school 
improvement, and the resulting conceptual model will set out how Ofsted aims to 
promote school improvement. Such a model has not been presented in literature 
before, however Ofsted (2005) presents a number of ways that inspection can have an 
impact. The model here will be developed in a systematic way using the ‘policy 
scientific approach’ (Leeuw, 2003). This is the first time an explicit conceptual model 
for Ofsted is set out in the literature and it has the advantage of having been validated 
by senior personnel at Ofsted. 
 
The policy scientific approach enables us to reconstruct the mechanisms that explain 
how the school inspection system in England aims to promote school improvement. 
The collection of mechanisms forms a ‘program theory’ (Chen, 1990 in Ehren et al, 
2005) that explains how inspection is expected to bring about school improvement. 
The program theory is then critically analysed to predict the (in)effectiveness of 
inspections in promoting improvement. This paper focuses on inspections in 
maintained schools in England in the age range of 4-16 years (Reception through to 
Year 11). The program theory described here necessarily focusses on one particular 
period in history and is based on the framework for school inspection that ran from 
September 2009 until August 2011. Ofsted is constantly evolving and has already 
moved on, although it can be argued that much of its essence is fairly constant. 
 
The paper aims to answer the following three research questions: 
 
- What are the mechanisms by which Ofsted’s actions are expected to 
improve the education of children and young people? 
- How consistent, precise and realistic are the mechanisms regarding the 
expected effects of inspections on promoting school improvement? 
- How likely are inspections to successfully promote school improvement? 
 
The paper will begin with a brief overview of the method used to analyse the 
inspection system (program theory and policy scientific approach). The results of the 
various stages of the policy scientific approach will then be presented, ending with a 
program theory based on the assumptions underlying the government’s aim to 
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promote school improvement. The program theory will then be analysed in order to 
predict its (in)effectiveness. The paper concludes with a summary/discussion. 
 
 
Method 
 
A number of methods exist for reconstructing the theories and assumptions that 
underpin a program (see Leeuw, 2003). The method selected for this paper is the 
policy scientific approach (as outlined in Leeuw, 2003 and Ehren et al, 2005; and 
similar to the method described by Renger, 2011). This method is empirical and 
analytical in nature drawing strength from its reliance on multiple data sources 
(documents and interviews) as well as its use of diagrams to present the program 
theory (Leeuw, 2003). The approach consists of a number of steps which are 
presented below: 
 
Step 1: Reconstruction of the Program Theory 
 
This step involves reconstructing the mechanisms that explain how a program or 
policy aims to bring about its goals (in this case the mechanisms that explain how 
inspection aims to promote school improvement). The reconstructed mechanisms in 
turn form the reconstructed program theory. The reconstruction of the program theory 
is split into three stages: 
 
i) The aims of the program theory are stated.  
 
ii) Information is gathered from which the program theory will be constructed.  
 
iii) Information is translated from the source documents into mechanisms that will 
form the program theory. This involves searching for statements in the source 
documents that link the mechanisms to the goals of the program. These statements are 
then reformulated into ‘if-then’ statements and the collection of these reformulated 
statements/mechanisms forms the program theory. 
 
Step 2: Validation of the program theory 
 
Once the program theory is reconstructed it needs to be validated. In this instance the 
program theory was validated with relevant senior personnel from Ofsted to check 
whether the program theory is accurate. 
 
Step 3: Evaluation of the program theory 
 
The final step in the method is to evaluate the program theory. The program theory 
will be analysed for consistency, completeness and realism in order to estimate the 
mechanisms’ potential for meeting the intended effects of promoting school 
improvement. There will be a check of the consistencies in the logic of the 
mechanisms and a check of whether the mechanisms are clear or have any gaps. The 
mechanisms are also analysed for realism using evidence from literature. 
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Results 
 
The aim of the program theory presented in this paper is to describe and evaluate the 
assumptions that underpin Ofsted’s role in promoting school improvement for the 
period September 2009 until August 2011. The program theory is based on two levels 
of information/evidence: explicit information in the Ofsted literature and Acts of 
Parliament, and implicit mechanisms commonly believed by Ofsted as an organisation 
but not explicitly written down. An insight into these mechanisms can be gained 
through comments made by staff at Ofsted through interviews as part of the validation 
process and through speeches made by the Chief Executive of Ofsted (Christine 
Gilbert) at the time. The evidence at this level varies in that different members of staff 
may have different opinions as to the role Ofsted plays in driving improvement.  
 
 
Source documents 
 
The key functions of Ofsted are set out in law through two key Acts of Parliament – 
the Education Act 2005 (England, 2005) and the Education and Inspection Act 2006 
(England, 2006) (elements of which supersede the 2005 Act). In addition to the 
requirements of law, details on the frameworks and mechanisms used by Ofsted in 
order to meet its aims are set out in key Ofsted documents. The conceptual model 
presented in this paper is based on evidence from the following documents: 
 
1. Education Act 2005 (England, 2005) 
2. Education and Inspections Act 2006 (England, 2006) 
3. The Framework for School Inspection (Ofsted, 2009a) 
4. Ofsted Inspects (Ofsted, 2009b) 
5. Ofsted, Raising standards, improving lives (Ofsted, 2009c) 
6. The Evaluation schedule for schools (Ofsted, 2010) 
 
 
Overview of Ofsted as defined by Education Acts  
 
Prior to the Education and Inspections Act 2006 the primary function of Ofsted as 
outlined in the 2005 Education Act was to keep the Secretary of State informed about 
matters connected to the quality of Education provided by schools in England (and 
Wales in a separate section of the Act). Examples of such matters include educational 
standards achieved in schools, the quality of the leadership and management of 
schools and the behaviour and attendance of pupils. It was set in law that the Chief 
Inspector should make an annual report, and provide additional reports where needed, 
to the Secretary of State on the state of English schools. The Act gave Ofsted the right 
of entry into schools, including access to pupils and records. It was also stated that all 
schools in England (excluding private (fee-paying) schools) should be inspected 
within a given time period. Regulations from September 2009 state that all maintained 
schools must be inspected every 5 years. These compulsory inspections are known as 
‘Section 5’ inspections as they are specified in Section 5 of the Education Act. 
 
In addition to Section 5 inspections, Section 8 of the Act gave the inspectorate the 
power to perform further inspections at the discretion of the inspector. These 
inspections are known as ‘Section 8’ inspections. 
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The Act also specified that where schools were found lacking (i.e. schools causing 
concern) in the Section 5 inspections they should be categorised as being in either 
‘special measures’ if the school is failing and does not have the capacity to improve 
(as judged by Ofsted) or given a ‘notice to improve’ where schools are required to 
improve as they are performing ‘less well than expected’ (Section 13, England, 2005). 
Schools in special measures are required to work with the local authority (Section 15, 
ibid) and if no improvement is seen they are under threat of closure by the Secretary 
of State (Section 45, ibid).  
 
The 2005 Act as it stood did not state any direct functions related to the improvement 
of schools or the raising of standards in schools. Apart from the power to put a small 
proportion of failing schools into special measures and demand improvement, the 
exercise of inspecting all schools in England was explicitly for the purpose of 
informing government. 
 
The majority of the 2005 Education Act that refers to inspection still held for the 
period covered by this paper and still holds at this time of writing, however in 2006 
the Education and Inspections Act rewrote the main functions of Ofsted and 
superseded the functions stated in the 2005 Act. The new functions of Ofsted are set 
out in Sections 116 to 119 of the Act. Sections 116 and 118 show that the key 
functions of Ofsted are still to keep the Secretary of State informed about the quality 
of schools and to give advice. For example: 
 
The Chief Inspector has the general duty of keeping the Secretary of State informed 
about— 
(a) the quality of activities within the Chief Inspector's remit and (where 
appropriate) the standards achieved by those for whose benefit such activities 
are carried on, 
Section 118 (1) (a), England (2006) 
 
However the 2006 Act places a new emphasis on promoting improvement (as well as 
ensuring services are user-focussed and provide value for money): 
 
(1) The Office is to perform its functions for the general purpose of 
encouraging— 
(a) the improvement of activities within the Chief Inspector's remit, 
 
Section 117 (1) (a), England (2006) 
 
Clearly, one of Ofsted’s overarching aims is to promote improvement, however there 
is not a tightly coupled causal link which states that Ofsted aims to improve standards 
in schools, rather it aims to ‘encourage’ (i.e. promote) improved standards. However, 
as a result of promoting improvement, we would expect to see improvement in a 
proportion of schools. The mechanisms of school inspections that Ofsted aim to use to 
promote improvement are presented in the next section. 
 
 
Background information on Ofsted gradings and monitoring inspections from ‘The 
evaluation schedule for schools’ (Ofsted, 2010) 
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Specific information on the gradings awarded to schools following inspections are not 
found in the Acts, but can be found, along with grade descriptors, in the Ofsted 
document ‘The evaluation schedule for schools’ (Ofsted, 2010). As a result of Section 
5 inspections schools are graded as either ‘outstanding’, ‘good’, ‘satisfactory’ or 
‘inadequate’. Schools graded as inadequate are further split into schools with a notice 
to improve and schools in ‘special measures’. All schools graded as inadequate and a 
proportion of schools graded as satisfactory receive ‘Section 8’ monitoring 
inspections. The timings and frequency of Section 8 inspections vary according to 
whether the school is satisfactory, has a notice to improve or is in special measures. 
There are therefore three thresholds for three different monitoring processes, 
numbered 1, 2 and 3 on Figure 1 below. Figure 1 also presents the proportion of 
schools and the number of schools placed in each category in 2008/09. 
 
Figure 1: Summary of Ofsted inspection gradings and thresholds, annotated with figures and 
proportions from 2008/09 Section 5 inspections 
 
19% 50%
~1011 primary 
schools
~2661 primary schools
203 secondary 
schools
535 secondary schools
Outstanding Good
~40% of 
schools 
judged as 
satisfactory 
were 
monitored
Notice to 
improve
Special 
measures
300 secondary schools 43 secondary schools
Satisfactory Inadequate
28% 4%
~1490 primary schools ~213 primary schools
1 2 3
 
 
Information on the standards against which schools are judged during inspections  
 
‘The framework for school inspection’ (Ofsted, 2009a) sets out an overview of the 
standards that are set and specific details are presented in the ‘Evaluation Schedule for 
schools’ (Ofsted, 2010). In summary, schools are judged and graded on seven key 
areas related to pupil outcomes (including attainment, progress and behaviour), three 
judgements concerning the effectiveness of provision (for example the quality of 
teaching) and eight judgements related to the leadership and management of schools. 
 
 
Evidence linking the mechanisms of Ofsted to the goal of promoting school 
improvement 
 
Documentation evidence 
As noted above Section 117 of the ‘Education and Inspection Act 2006’ (England, 
2006) makes it clear that one of the primary aims of Ofsted is to encourage the 
improvement of schools, and the education system as a whole through inspection. The 
document ‘The Framework for School Inspection’ (Ofsted, 2009a) explains the 
mechanisms by which Ofsted aims to use school inspections to promote the 
improvement of schools. Further mechanisms are highlighted in ‘Ofsted, Raising 
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standards, improving lives’ (Ofsted, 2009c). Details on how Ofsted aims to maximise 
the effect of promoting improvement through inspections are found in the document 
‘Ofsted Inspects’ (Ofsted, 2009b). 
 
‘The Framework for School Inspection’ (Ofsted, 2009a) makes is explicit that school 
inspections aim to promote improvement in four key ways. Firstly, by setting 
expectations, schools are given a description of the standards they are expected to 
meet, and as highlighted in Ofsted (2005), the anticipation of an inspection provides 
an impetus to meet these standards. Secondly, by increasing a school’s confidence by 
endorsing the school’s own view of its effectiveness (if it is accurate), or by providing 
a ‘sharp challenge (and an impetus to act)’ if improvement is needed. Thirdly, by 
recommending priorities for school action, and in some cases following up progress, 
although emphasis is placed on the capacity of school to actually respond to these 
recommendations (ibid). Finally inspection is considered to promote improvement 
through the conversations between inspectors and senior managers at school during 
the inspection. The inspection process is considered to complement the school’s self-
evaluation and promote its rigour. 
Explicit statements that link the placing of schools in special measures/notice to 
improve/satisfactory with extra monitoring to school improvement are difficult to 
find, although it is implicit that local authority involvement, extra monitoring etc are 
intended to promote improvement. 
 
‘Ofsted, raising standards, improving lives’ (Ofsted, 2009c) makes it clear that as well 
as influencing schools, inspections can promote improvement by influencing policy-
thinking and policy -making. Evidence collected through inspections is disseminated 
via survey reports on a range of topics, including subject reports and reports of other 
aspects of learning in schools. As well as reports, conferences and other publications 
are provided for schools in order to highlight areas of good practice, e.g. ‘Twelve 
Outstanding Secondary Schools’ (Ofsted, 2009d). 
 
Interview evidence 
Although difficult to find explicitly in key documents, it was clear from our initial 
interview meeting with key personnel at Ofsted that an important mechanism for 
driving improvement is related to the publication of inspection reports. Any parent 
can view a report and they can use this information to inform their decisions about 
what school to apply to for their child. This adds market forces into the education 
system. Parents can choose the good schools and avoid the weak schools. The 
argument is that by making the reports public schools will do what they can to 
improve on standards, not only to save face, but also because school admissions can 
have a big effect on job security. As school funding is linked to the number of pupils, 
parents ‘flocking’ to a particular school can give job security to school staff, whereas 
a poor report that leads to parents avoiding a school can lead to job insecurity and job 
losses. Schools should be highly motivated to avoid being on the wrong side of 
inspection thresholds. 
The validation meeting highlighted powerful incentives for schools to be judged as 
‘outstanding’. These incentives, in effect, act as rewards. They include the fact that 
outstanding schools can apply for ‘Academy’ status, they can become ‘teaching 
schools’ and head teachers from outstanding schools can apply to become national 
leaders of education (NLEs). There is some evidence that these incentives are driving 
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change as Ofsted is being contacted by non-outstanding schools asking to be re-
inspected.  
The validation process also highlighted the fact that inspections could be triggered 
sooner if, for example, serious complaints were made about a school. For a small 
number of schools, it was thought that this threat may be enough to keep standards 
from slipping.  
 
Further information on how improvement occurs was highlighted in the 
interview/validation meeting. It was made clear that school improvement does not 
happen on its own – it happens in relationship with other drivers of improvement. 
Ofsted’s improvement role is dependent on other actors, with the three key actors 
being parents, policy makers and schools.  
 
The role of parents is seen to be the primary determinant of pupil outcomes, including 
attainment. A school’s engagement with parents is therefore critical. The parents’ role 
in driving improvement surrounds public availability of inspection reports. There are 
two mechanisms involved here. Firstly, parents can use the reports when deciding 
which school to apply to for their child. This introduces market forces. Parents use the 
reports to ‘vote with their feet’ so that strong schools grow and become 
oversubscribed and weak schools receive fewer applicants. This mechanism (the 
publication of reports) is seen by schools as being more of a sanction/reward than the 
threat of school closure. School closure resulting in job losses affects a small minority 
of schools whereas admissions has more of an immediate impact on the reputation of 
the school and changes in admissions can affect the security of jobs. A second 
mechanism is that parents may pressurise schools directly to improve. 
 
The mechanisms that directly involve schools operate at two levels (head 
teacher/senior management team level and the teachers themselves). A lot of 
emphasis is placed on the relationship between the head teacher and the inspectors. 
The head teacher will often accompany the inspectors as they observe lessons. A 
dialogue will occur between the head teacher and the inspector in order to gauge 
whether the two of them make the same judgements as each other. This can amount to 
mentoring the head teacher. A lot of emphasis is placed on ascertaining whether the 
head teacher and senior management have an accurate view of the school, its strong 
points and its areas for improvement. If a school has an accurate view of itself then it 
is more likely to be able to identify areas for improvement and put into practice plans 
for development. At the teacher level, a sample of lessons is observed during an 
inspection and feedback is available to the teachers who are observed. 
 
Ofsted is reliant on these actors. They cannot directly make schools do anything apart 
from the small minority of schools that may close as a result of being in special 
measures and not improving. Inspection is a ‘nudge’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) 
mechanism. Similarly, peer review may also act as a mechanism involving actors 
other than Ofsted. 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Reformulation of the statements into conditional ‘if-then’ type propositions 
 
Statements from documents and interviews have been reformulated into conditional 
‘if-then’ statements to describe the mechanisms that lie behind the goal of promoting 
school improvement. These statements have been grouped into five broad 
mechanisms and are presented in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1: The assumptions underlying school inspections in England 
 
Setting Standards 
1. If schools are given details (criteria and descriptors) on the standard of performance expected of schools then 
they will attempt to meet those expectations and this will have a positive impact on average. 
1.1 If standards are set, then schools can complete the self-evaluation form (SEF) in order to rate 
themselves against standards.  
1.2 If accurate, this form will allow schools to identify areas for improvement. 
1.3 If areas are identified for improvement then a development plan can be created. 
1.4 If schools have a development plan then the development plan can be put into action. 
1.5 If the plan is put into action effectively then schools will improve as a result. 
 
Giving Feedback 
2. If schools are given feedback about strengths and weaknesses they will use this feedback to improve. 
2.1 If inspections endorse the schools own view of their effectiveness (when it is accurate) it will lead to 
improved confidence which will in turn lead to improvement on average. If a school does not judge itself 
accurately then a sharp challenge is given and an impetus act which will lead to improvement. 
2.2. If Ofsted recommends priorities for future action and checks progress where it is deemed appropriate 
schools will generally improve.  
2.3 If a constructive dialogue between inspectors and the senior leaders and staff of the school is established 
the school will be more likely to improve.  
2.4 If precise actions to underpin the recommendations are identified then schools are more likely to improve. 
 
Sanctions and Rewards 
3. If schools receive sanctions and rewards they will be motivated to improve  
3.1 If (a small minority of) failing schools are placed in special measures then the schools will improve in 
order to move out of special measure and to avoid sanctions (e.g. job losses and school closure) 
3.2 If outstanding schools are given rewards then schools will improve to become outstanding in order to 
receive those rewards 
 
Collecting information 
4. Collecting information 
4.1 If information gathered from inspections is passed on to policy makers then it will inform their thinking 
and decision making which will lead to policies that promote improvement. 
4.2 If examples of good practice observed during inspections are disseminated through reports, conferences 
and other publications this will promote school improvement within the schools themselves. 
 
Public Accountability 
5. If inspection reports are published then schools will be motivated to improve in order to save face and remain 
/become popular. 
5.1 If reports are published parents will read them or come to know of their contents 
5.2 If parents know about the content of reports they  can make informed choices about what schools to apply 
to for their child 
5.3 If a school gets a good Ofsted report more parents will want to apply to that school, and conversely, if 
school receives a poor Ofsted grading parents will want to avoid that school 
5.4 If school applications increase then a school will become oversubscribed and there will be job security for 
school staff. If school applications decrease then a school will become undersubscribed and as school 
funding is based on pupil numbers jobs will become insecure and/or there will be job losses. 
5.5 If the publishing of inspection reports affects job security then schools will improve in order to get good 
inspection results and enhance job security. 
5.6 If it is known that inspections can be initiated at any time due to ‘whistleblowers’ then schools will keep 
their standards up 
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Summary of the Program Theory 
 
The mechanisms described in Table 1 can be placed together graphically to present a 
program theory that demonstrates how inspection intends to promote improvement – 
see Figure 2. It is important to highlight here again that the program theory relies on 
the role of actors, other than the inspectorate, such as parents, policy makers and 
schools. 
Figure 2: Program theory to show how Ofsted inspections are expected to promote school 
improvement 
1. Setting 
Standards
1.1 Schools improve to 
meet standards
SE endorsed and 
confidence increased
SE judged 
inaccurate; schools 
given challenge to 
improve and impetus 
to act
2. Giving 
feedback
3. Sanctions 
and rewards
3.1 Failing schools improve 
to avoid the sanction of job 
losses/school closure
2.1 Comments made on 
self evaluation
2.2 Recommendations 
given for future priorities
5. Public 
accountability
Progress checked
3.2 Good schools improve 
in order to access the 
rewards offered to 
outstanding schools
4. Collecting 
information
4.1 Policy decisions 
informed
4.2 Good practice 
disseminated
5.1 Inspection reports 
published and parents apply 
to stronger schools
Schools improve to 
keep admissions
2.3 Constructive dialogue 
fostered with senior leaders 
and staff of school
5.2 Complaints made 
against a school can initiate 
an early/extra inspection
School keep their 
standards up to 
avoid extra/early 
inspection
S
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Validation of the Program Theory 
 
A face-to-face validation meeting with personnel from Ofsted took place at Ofsted 
Headquarters in London on 17th March 2011. A follow-up telephone conference call 
took place on 21st March 2011. 
 
At the face-to-face meeting the first draft of the program theory was presented and 
discussed in order to check whether it is was an accurate representation of the 
mechanisms that are intended to promote school improvement. The program theory 
was adjusted and presented back to Ofsted staff prior to the telephone conference call. 
The program theory presented above is the final version after consultation.  
 
 
Evaluation of the Program Theory  
 
The final stage of the policy scientific approach is to evaluate the program theory. 
This involves critically evaluating the steps in the logic in order to identify any gaps, 
i.e. are the mechanisms complete and consistent? It also involves evaluating the 
program theory for realism. This involves searching the literature for evidence that 
indicates whether or not the program theory will be successful.  
 
Consistency 
 
Here the question is asked as to whether there are any logical inconsistencies in the 
mechanisms of the program theory. Inspection in England is considered to be a 
‘nudge’ mechanism (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), meaning it does not directly cause 
improvement, but rather nudges other actors into improving schools. This corresponds 
to the stated position that Ofsted ‘promotes’ school improvement. It relies on schools, 
parents and policy makers to do the improving. Schools do not have to act on 
feedback and advice given during inspection (apart from the small minority of schools 
in special measures). It is however assumed that some schools will act on feedback 
and suggestions for improvement.  
 
One possible inconsistency lies with the mechanisms suggesting that market forces in 
education lead to school improvement. This could be a ‘zero sum game’ – some 
schools get better whilst others decline – but it is acknowledged that the view is that 
more would improve than are harmed. 
 
 
Completeness 
 
Here the mechanisms underlying the program theory are assessed to investigate 
whether they are clearly defined or leave gaps. The findings are that in general the 
mechanisms are clearly defined. 
 
 
Realism 
 
Searching the literature for each of the mechanisms in the program theory is a vast 
undertaking, not within the scope of this paper. The literature alone on feedback is 
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voluminous. Many have proposed models on feedback and suggested the conditions 
under which feedback is maximised (see for example Hattie and Timperley, 2007; 
Coe, 1998; Black and Wiliam, 1998; Brimblecombe et al, 1996; Brinko, 1993). What 
we do know is that the mechanisms are complex and do not show simple solutions. 
Coe (1998) states that theories based on good empirical evidence that link the effects 
of feedback on performance are limited and care needs to be taken in translating these 
inferences from one context to another. He argues that the view that ‘those who 
receive feedback on a task perform better than those who do not’ cannot be 
universally accepted from the literature. The literature does not give a simple answer 
as to whether feedback will lead to school improvement. Hattie and Timperley (2007) 
provide a detailed theoretical model which aims to give a clear account of when 
feedback is likely to have a positive effect so far as student learning is concerned. 
Their account makes it clear that the possibility of feedback having negative outcomes 
is very real. Unfortunately we lack a similar account, and the empirical data, for 
feedback from inspections.  
 
Even when the literature is vast, the findings can be inconclusive and not necessarily 
specific to the school level. But there are also aspects of the program theory where 
there is no empirical evidence in the literature to illustrate if the particular mechanism 
works or not. An example is the key mechanism that states that inspectors’ endorse or 
challenge the school’s self-evaluation in order to motivate and encourage school 
improvement. 
 
Clearly more research is needed, which focusses on the individual mechanisms of 
inspection, aimed at the school level. In light of this, the best that can be done here is 
treat the complete program theory as a black box and ask what impact inspection has 
had. A number of studies have attempted to measure the effects of inspection visits on 
pupil attainment, arguably a key indicator of school quality (Gray and Wilcox, 1995). 
The studies have mainly been carried out in England and the Netherlands and the 
findings have been mixed. An Ofsted report (Matthews and Sammons, 2004), looking 
at schools inspected over the period of 1993-2002, claims that, on average, school 
performance in national exams (Key Stage 4) at age sixteen is better in the two years 
following inspection (paragraph 68). In contrast, Gray and Wilcox (1995) and 
Cullingford and Daniels (1999) found that Ofsted inspections have a negative impact 
on the proportion of pupils achieving 5A*-C grades at GCSE in England, although 
prior attainment is not taken into account in their design, external validity is weak and 
the authors themselves point out that they cannot claim causality. Shaw et al (2003) 
and Rosenthal (2004) used more sophisticated methods and again, both conclude that 
Ofsted inspection had a small negative impact on GCSE results (taken at age 16) in 
state secondary schools in the year following inspection. Rosenthal postulates that this 
is due to schools focussing on Ofsted standards during the year of inspection, perhaps 
at the expense of student attainment. As De Wolf and Janssens (2007) point out, these 
studies do not look at the longer term impact of inspection or the impact in other 
sectors of education, including primary schools. In addition, they all relate to earlier 
versions of Ofsted inspections. More recently, using more sophisticated and stronger 
designs, Hussain (2012) and Allen and Burgess (2012) have focussed on the impact of 
inspections on the minority of schools that fail inspections (i.e. those that receive an 
‘unsatisfactory’ grading in their main Ofsted inspections). Hussain focusses on the 
national Key Stage 2 tests taken at the end of Primary School (age 11) and found that 
failing an inspection led to increased test gains of around 0.1 of a standard deviation.  
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Allen and Burgess found that schools that just fail their inspection see an 
improvement in test scores two and three years after inspection. The positive impact 
was mainly found of middle and higher ability pupils. Outside of England, Luginbuhl 
et al (2009) studied the effects of Dutch primary school inspections on test scores 
finding small positive effects and no effects using two different designs. 
 
As documented in De Wolf et al (2007) it is widely accepted that school inspections 
and accountability systems in general have side-effects/unintended effects (see for 
example Smith, 1995; Fitz-Gibbon, 1997; Chapman, 2001; Koretz, 2002). One key 
example of unintended strategic behaviour is ‘myopia’, described by Smith (1995) as 
the focus on short-term solutions at the expense of long-term improvement, for 
example schools changing their curriculum away from academic subjects that are 
perceived as difficult towards vocational subjects that are perceived as easy in an 
attempt to increase examination results. Another key unintended effect is ‘teaching to 
the test’ or ‘indicator fixation’ where teachers have excessive concentration on exam 
performance (see Fitz-Gibbon (1997) and Koretz (2002)). Leeuw (2000) suggests that 
the undesired effects may have the capacity to undo any of the positive effects of 
school inspections. In light of this, any study of the impact of school inspections 
needs to take into account the impact of any undesired effects.  
 
 
Discussion/Summary 
 
This paper presents a clear, validated model of the assumptions the lie behind 
Ofsted’s aim to promote school improvement. This provides a structure within which 
the impact of inspection can be assessed. At the moment there is a lack of evidence 
from strong research designs to assess the impact of inspections and the assumption 
that there is a causal link between inspections and school improvement cannot be 
clearly supported from the literature. Research is needed, using strong research 
designs aimed at investigating the causal link between inspections and school 
improvement for all schools, including measuring both the short term and long term 
impact of inspections. Research that provides more evidence on the potential success 
of the individual mechanisms in the program theory would be particularly valuable. 
This research would need to take into account unintended consequences of school 
inspection. This research could be used to improve the existing system, but also to 
inform changes to the structure of the system itself. 
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